RST Flood Attack: Forged Resets That Drop Real Sessions
An RST flood sends forged TCP reset packets aimed at forcing established, legitimate connections to close early — a targeted disruption of active sessions rather than pure resource exhaustion.
Written for business and infrastructure decision-makers, not protocol engineers.
What is a RST Flood?
A TCP RST packet normally signals an abrupt, abnormal connection close. During an RST flood, attackers send forged resets that attempt to match an active connection's source, sequence number, and state closely enough to be accepted, terminating a session the two real endpoints never intended to close.
If the cancellation isn't checked against the actual order details, it goes through and the real customer's transaction is interrupted. An RST flood works the same way against active network sessions — forged resets that aren't checked against real connection state can end them prematurely.
The attack happens in the network.
The consequences happen to the business.
Availability risk that belongs in business-continuity planning.
Availability risk that belongs in business-continuity planning.
Availability risk that belongs in business-continuity planning.
Availability risk that belongs in business-continuity planning.
Why this attack matters.
RST-based attacks matter because they can disrupt specific active sessions — video calls, trading connections, gameplay — rather than only degrading capacity broadly. That makes them relevant even to services with otherwise ample bandwidth and connection headroom.
Most relevant where internet availability is part of the product.
Attacks against one customer can become an infrastructure and service-quality issue.
Availability, latency and shared network resources are immediately visible to end users.
If users cannot connect, they cannot transact, work or consume the service they pay for.
Questions to ask your technology team.
- What happens if this traffic suddenly increases by orders of magnitude?
- Can legitimate customers continue using the service while mitigation is active?
- Where is malicious traffic physically stopped?
- Can one attacked customer affect shared infrastructure?
- What happens if an attack exceeds our available upstream capacity?
NeuroWall helps protect against rst flood attacks.
NeuroWall validates RST source, sequence, and state before honoring it, off by default alongside FIN validation for the same false-positive-avoidance rationale — protecting active sessions from forged resets once enabled.
Book a DemoFrequently asked questions about RST Flood attacks
- An RST flood sends forged TCP reset packets attempting to match an active connection closely enough to force it closed prematurely.
- A FIN flood mainly targets processing capacity with bogus teardown packets for connections that don't exist. An RST flood targets specific real, active connections to disrupt them.
- Long-lived connections — video calls, trading platforms, gaming sessions — where prematurely closing one active session has an immediate, visible impact on a real user.
- It can be. When distributed sources generate the traffic simultaneously, it is a distributed denial-of-service attack.
- Yes. NeuroWall validates RST source, sequence, and state before honoring resets, as part of its DDoS protection capabilities.